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# The Export of Islam

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Almost from Islam's inception, rivals staked incompatible claims to speak in the name of the true faith. This contest continued into modern times, and has been exacerbated by the rise of a radical Islam formulated in response to the challenge of the West. Some of these versions of Islam were identified with regimes; others, with populist or clandestine movements. Yet each of these contestants subscribed to the same conviction: that the Islam which it propounded had universal validity. Iran openly spoke of "exporting" its message of Islamic revolution, and so appropriated the term. But many other regimes and movements did the same, by a wide variety of means. The governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Libya actively exported their state-supported interpretations of Islam abroad. Independent fundamentalist movements, Sunni and Shi'i, did the same. Even the great powers gave encouragement to versions of Islam they deemed compatible with their interests. In 1986, these many rivals continued an intensive cross-exchange of ideas. When persuasion failed, some were not averse to the use of coercion. The competition in the marketplace of Islamic ideas had grown fierce; above all, the export of Islam remained a battle for uncommitted minds.

## THE IMPASSE IN MUSLIM DIPLOMACY

The Jidda-based Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), the instrument of Muslim consensus-building, remained paralyzed by the apparent indifference of many of its 46 member States to the fate of the beleaguered organization. (On the development of the ICO's crisis, see *Middle East Contemporary Survey* [*MECS*], 1981–82, pp 283–84; 298–301; 1982–83, pp 235–37; 1983–84, pp 158–65; 1984–85, pp 146–48.) The ICO had failed to reconcile two warring member States, Iran and Iraq, and had yet to engineer a Muslim agreement on the question of Israel's legitimacy and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The deliberations of the ICO's annual conferences of Foreign Ministers and the triennial Islamic summit conferences only drew more attention to these failings. ICO Secretary-General Sharifuddin Pirzada, who took up his office in December 1984, was not always willing to suffer his disappointments in silence, but necessity dictated that he blunt his criticism and seek to mend differences behind closed doors.

### FOREIGN MINISTERS IN FEZ AND AFTERMATH

The ICO's 16th annual conference of Foreign Ministers met in Fez, Morocco, from 6–10 January 1986. Despite its swollen agenda of 91 items, the gathering did not move the Muslim consensus past the point where it stood following the previous meeting in San'a a year earlier. Once again, Iran, Libya, and Syria challenged Egypt's resumed membership in the ICO, on the grounds that relations with Israel were utterly

incompatible with membership. (On Egypt's controversial status in the ICO, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp 127–30, 160–62). "How can a government that claims to be Arab and Muslim reach an accord with the Zionist enemy, which is hostile to Arabism and Islam?" asked Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar'.[1] Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid responded by noting that Egypt's hands, unlike those of Syria, were not stained with Palestinian blood — a reference to the Syrian-directed expulsion of the PLO from Tripoli in Lebanon.[2] In the end, the rejectionist challenge failed, and no changes were made to the detriment of Egypt.[3] A final resolution of the conference kept up the pretense of moral outrage, by calling upon all ICO member States to sever direct and indirect relations with Israel.[4] In response, Egypt's 'Abd al-Majid expressed his Government's formal reservations over a resolution which Egypt considered an infringement of its sovereignty.[5] By this time it seemed quite clear that the majority of member States did not really regard relations with Israel as sufficient grounds for exclusion from the ICO, however abhorrent such relations might be. The issue surfaced again in July 1986, when Morocco's King Hasan openly received Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres in Morocco. Hasan came under severe criticism in the wider Arab world, and was compelled to resign his presidency of the Arab League (see chapter on inter-Arab affairs). But Pirzada was probably truthful in affirming that there was no concurrent move to have Morocco expelled from the ICO.[6] For if Egypt's greater sin did not disqualify it from membership, how could Morocco be held to account for a lesser infraction?

The conference did make an unexpected demonstration of solidarity on Libya's behalf. The meeting coincided with US threats and sanctions against Libya, in retaliation for Libya's alleged role in the terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports (see chapter on armed operations). In two carefully worded statements, the conference condemned the US political and economic measures taken against Libya.[7] But at the same time, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz took the opportunity to openly reprimand Libya for continuing to "threaten neighboring Islamic countries," and urged Libya to "learn its lesson" from the threat it now faced.[8] The Libyan delegate reportedly sought a stiffer resolution calling for a Muslim counter-boycott of the US, but he could not muster the support.[9] In any event, words of Muslim support did not exercise any deterrent effect upon the US.

The complete absence of any reference to the Gulf war in the final resolutions came as the principal surprise of the conference. No one expected a breakthrough toward a cease-fire, but observers expected that the conference would reiterate past ICO resolutions.[10] Indeed, six member States proposed that the ICO issue a neutral "appeal" to both sides, in the hope of revitalizing the ICO's "good offices" committee. Iraq supported the proposal, but felt the appeal should be issued only to Iran, since Iraq already accepted ICO mediation; Iran opposed the appeal, on the grounds that it did not expressly label Iraq the aggressor.[11] The matter came up for discussion during a marathon seven-hour session, during which Iran and Iraq presented their grievances at length. But the last-minute decision of Pakistan, one of the proposal's sponsors, to rescind its sponsorship of the appeal, led to procedural mayhem from which the conference never extracted itself. This was the first time since the outbreak of the war that an ICO deliberation of this magnitude failed to include a reference to the Gulf war in its resolutions and recommendations.[12] Iraq openly counted this as defeat; Iran regarded it as a victory.[13] Pirzada was anxious to put the episode in the best light: it

was wrong to deem the entire conference a failure simply because no agreeable formula could be reached on the war.[14] But the "good offices" committee remained moribund,[15] and there were even ICO member States which favored its dissolution.[16] The committee, led by Gambian President Dawda Jawara, apparently realized the uselessness of attempting mediation before both parties exhausted themselves. This plainly did not happen in 1986, as Iran launched offensive after offensive (see essay on Iraqi-Iranian war). The committee did not convene again until November 1986, when it met in Jidda in anticipation of the Islamic summit conference scheduled for Kuwait in January 1987. (The diplomacy preceding that summit will be considered in *MECS* 1987.)

On the question of Palestine, the Fez conference reiterated past resolutions. Shortly after the close of the conference, an Arab-Jewish clash on the grounds around the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem led the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasir 'Arafat, to request an emergency meeting of the ICO's Jerusalem Committee. The gathering, which met from 21–22 January 1986 under the presidency of King Hasan, passed numerous resolutions calling for intensified information efforts against the "Judaizing" of Muslim holy places.[17] 'Arafat emphasized in his speech to the meeting that Muslim shrines were not the only threatened holy places; Israel had also made "criminal attempts to violate the Christian shrines in that city."[18] No one in the Muslim world was better placed than Morocco's Hasan to raise the issue of Jerusalem in the Christian world. In August 1985, Hasan hosted a visit by Pope John Paul II, who addressed 80,000 Muslim youths in Casablanca. In the Vatican's eyes, Hasan was a prime candidate to represent Islam in any future Christian-Muslim dialogue; hence, 'Arafat's eagerness to work through the Jerusalem Committee in appealing to Christian conscience.[19] But Syria was not at all eager, for it regarded both Hasan and 'Arafat as arch compromisers of the struggle against Israel. Damascus thus continued its boycott of the Jerusalem Committee originally begun in May 1984 (see *MECS* 1983–84, p 164).

On the question of Afghanistan, Pirzada proceeded with great caution, pinning his hopes on the professed desire of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to see Soviet forces out of Afghanistan. At Fez, an Afghan delegation led by resistance leader Ahmad Gaylani announced that it was seeking full ICO membership for the Peshawar-based coalition of the seven groups bearing the brunt of the guerrilla fighting.[20] These would occupy the seat vacated following the ICO's January 1980 suspension of Afghanistan's membership in the organization.[21] But the attempt drew insufficient support, for Pirzada sought first to determine the sincerity of Gorbachev's interest in disengagement. This culminated in Pirzada's November 1986 visit to the Soviet Union, where he met with Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The Soviets withdrew six regiments from Afghanistan on the eve of Pirzada's visit, a move meant to indicate goodwill, but without military import.

Pirzada came away from his Moscow visit with "very positive impressions. Our positions are still not congruent, but one can see a desire in the new [Soviet] leadership to reach for the goodwill and friendship of the Muslim world. The desire is there, but what I feel is that perhaps the system is not yet ready with the necessary policy formulations." The Soviets told Pirzada that they wanted to disengage quickly from Afghanistan, but only if the survival of the Soviet-backed regime could be guaranteed — a solution Pirzada said "obviously will not work."[22] Through Pirzada's visit, both

the Soviets and the ICO's Secretary-General sought to take each other's measure, but there was no actual movement toward a solution to the Afghan war during 1986. (Similar expectations fueled by Gorbachev also produced a positive Muslim response to another Soviet initiative, a conference gathering "Muslims for Peace"; see below.)

While it proved impossible to expand the Muslim consensus on political issues, the ICO did expand its membership by admitting Nigeria as a full member at the Fez meeting. Nigeria is a secular State, in which Muslims constitute the majority, but Christians and believers in traditional religions form large minorities. Until the Fez conference, Nigeria enjoyed only observer status in the ICO. At Fez, the Nigerian Government submitted its application for ICO membership without public debate in the country, prompting heated argument in Nigeria once word got out. Christian leaders saw the decision as a threat to Nigeria's official secularism, since it somehow implied that Nigeria was a Muslim State. The Nigerian Government of Maj-Gen Ibrahim Babangida (a Muslim) responded to the criticism by appointing a 26-man panel led by the Minister of Interior (a Christian) to "determine the implications" of Nigeria's full membership in the ICO.[23] The panel's report, submitted on 20 March 1986, resolved in favor of Nigeria's remaining in the ICO.[24] But Christians remained anxious. "We have now suddenly found our necks stuck in the yoke of the spiritual bondage of the ICO," declared the Anglican Bishop of Kaduna. "This is the beginning of our end as a nation."[25] The controversy had more to do with the fragile state of Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria than with the real obligations of ICO membership. The ICO's purpose was political rather than religious; its membership already included other secular and multi-confessional States, such as Turkey and Lebanon.

## ECONOMICS OF MUSLIM SOLIDARITY

A political consensus on the major crises affecting the Muslim world thus eluded the ICO in 1986, and its conference resolutions and Pirzada's statements went largely ignored in the wider world. Even worse, much of the organization's own membership demonstrated an indifference to its operation. This was understandable in the case of member States which invariably found themselves in the minority in ICO forums. Iranian Prime Minister Mir Husayn Musavi might be expected to declare that "the ICO is in its most ineffective form at present. In other words, there is no emphasis on principles and values."[26] But the malaise spread much further, as Pirzada discovered soon after taking office. He found the ICO Secretariat in desperate financial straits because of the failure of member States to fulfill their obligations. The ICO could not even meet its own payroll and running expenses, and Pirzada warned member States that this would thwart the ICO's efforts to combat Israel, get Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, and end the Iraqi-Iranian war.[27] One of the three ICO Assistant Secretaries-General made this admission: "Not all Muslim countries have fulfilled their financial commitments. It is obvious that the ICO needs funds to organize its activities effectively. Due to the lack of sufficient funds, many of the ICO's projects have not been fully operationalized."[28] An unnamed source close to the ICO went still further, asserting that Saudi Arabia was the only member State that met its financial obligations regularly.[29]

By late 1986, the cumulative deficit reportedly came to $17m. Pirzada declared that financial support "is the one area where response from some countries is not very

encouraging... There are some countries, about ten, who are very regular in paying their annual contributions and another eight who also pay, but after a little effort."[30] Pirzada would later claim that his unusual appeal during 1986 met with a "good response," resulting in a "record payment" of 60 per cent of the contributions owed by member States.[31] Similar difficulties affected the institutions affiliated with the ICO. The International Islamic News Agency (IINA), first established in 1972, tottered on the verge of collapse. By the end of 1986, the IINA owed $2.3m, as a result of mismanagement and misuse of funds by the agency's executives. At the end of 1986, only seven member States had fully paid their assessed contributions for 1985; another 15 had made partial payment; and 24 had paid nothing at all.[32] A $700m plan for scientific cooperation between ICO member States also went nowhere, because of the ICO's inability to raise the $25m for a feasibility study.[33] This was the first time ICO officials had gone public with money complaints. The failure to meet obligations suggested that the ICO did not occupy a high place in the priorities of most member States, and that these were content to see the ICO lead a shoestring existence as a platform for political rhetoric. At the same time, ICO officials complained that member States harmed the effectiveness of the Secretariat and affiliated institutions by not applying a "rational recruitment policy" in sending representatives to serve at the Jidda headquarters.[34] This implied that postings to the ICO were regarded by some governments as simple sinecures.

It was in economics rather than politics that the ICO could point to a consistent record of achievement. The Jidda-based Islamic Development Bank (IDB), which began its activities in October 1975, had accomplished much in the course of its first decade. IDB financing in member States was applied to loans, equity investment, leasing, technical assistance, and foreign trade operations. The IDB's subscribed capital as of September 1985 stood at SDR1,952m. The largest subscribers were Saudi Arabia, SDR506m; Libya, SDR315m; Kuwait, SDR252m; United Arab Emirates, SDR195m; and Turkey, SDR160m. During the IDB's first decade of operation, it approved 523 projects valued at SDR4,813m. To handle this volume of business, the IDB's staff grew from 30 to 449 during the same period.[35] Only ICO member States had the right to the IDB membership and financing, and the IDB arguably buttressed the whole edifice of Muslim solidarity.

But there was a rub. Most of this financing did little to encourage trade among members, since the economies of Muslim States were geared to the production and consumption by the industrialized West. The trade volume of Muslim States among one another constituted only about 10 per cent of their total foreign trade.[36] To reduce the scale of this dependence, the ICO convened a conference of its standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation. Ministers of Finance and Agriculture met in Istanbul from 14–16 March 1986, in order to put together a plan for encouraging trade ties among ICO member States.[37] After much deliberation, the Standing Committee proposed the creation of a $300m fund to provide long-term commercial financing for mutual trade in "non-traditional" goods. Half the money would come from the IDB, and half from participating States.[38] Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal affirmed his Government's belief that "every concrete step toward economic cooperation will pave the way to defusing political tensions and enhancing our ties of friendship and brotherhood."[39] In future, he said, the Standing Committee's meetings would discuss transportation, communications, and energy.[40]

It was the old dream of a Muslim commonwealth, a vision thwarted in every modern generation by the economic realities of dependence. Its realization was arguably more remote than an end to the Gulf war, the restored independence of Afghanistan, or the liberation of Jerusalem.

When Pirzada viewed the ICO, he saw the full half of the glass. "How do you evaluate the functioning of an international organization like the ICO? One has to appreciate the fact that the ICO is not, or at least not yet, a supranational authority and therefore what it does or achieves is to be seen in the light of the fact that it is an association of sovereign States with their own limitations and particularisms. Yet it is a matter of great importance that these States have been coming together from time to time and at least exchanging their particular views and providing a statement of common position over a wide range of issues and problems affecting the Muslim world." With time, the sense of common interest would grow.[41] But Muslim critics were impatient, warning that "the organization has been unable to make any serious contribution to the solution or alleviation of the problems facing the Muslim States." The ICO, in this view, was all too likely to follow the road of the Arab League into oblivion.[42] The unresolved question was whether the ICO's progress would overtake the crisis of a divided Islam, before that crisis overwhelmed the ICO itself.

## SAUDI SERVANTS OF ISLAM

Saudi Arabia's insistent claim to speak for all Islam stood in direct conflict with the simultaneous claims of Muslim rivals such as Iran and Libya. The struggle among these claimants led the Saudis to seize every opportunity to demonstrate their solicitude for Islam. Perhaps the most notable gesture of the year was made by Saudi King Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. The preferred honorific of Saudi kings had long been "His Majesty." By Fahd's own decision, this was dropped; he now preferred the title of "Servant of the Two Sacred Shrines" of Mecca and Madina (*khadim al-haramayn al-sharifayn*). "I have wanted to replace this phrase 'His Majesty' by something I adore and am honored to carry and that is 'Servant of the Two Sacred Shrines'," Fahd announced, and the Saudi Information Minister decreed that Fahd "should be addressed as such in written and spoken forms."[43] This preference for an explicitly Islamic titulature, with its subtle evocation of the caliphate, expressed both the breadth of the Saudi claim and a certain sense of insecurity about the traditional formulations of Saudi legitimacy.

Saudi Arabia continued to press its case for worldwide Muslim recognition in a variety of ways. The most important of these remained the Mecca-based Muslim World League (MWL; *Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami*), the most ambitious of the Muslim missionary organizations, under the directorship of Secretary-General Dr 'Abdallah 'Umar al-Nasif. (On the MWL, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp 295–97; 1982–83, pp 246–47; 1983–84, pp 165–66; 1984–85, p 149.) The MWL's calendar consisted of numerous conferences which crowded the travel itineraries of its chief officers. Over the years, the MWL had created an extensive Muslim conference circuit, which served to strengthen Saudi ties with like-minded Muslim activists around the world. These friendships were cemented by Saudi support of Muslim associations and mosques abroad, administered for the most part by the MWL.

So extensive were the activities of the MWL that its old headquarters could no longer contain it. Throughout 1986, work progressed on new headquarters in Mecca:

a five-story building including offices, conference halls, a mosque, and a library. The complex cost SR90m. Future plans for the site called for building a new home for the MWL's training center for *imams* and missionaries, with dormitories for the students. The headquarters were scheduled for completion in May 1987.[44] With its move, the MWL would enjoy surroundings befitting an organization represented by 30 offices and 1,000 missionaries worldwide. According to Nasif, the MWL annually spent SR14m on these missionaries, and spent another SR5.6m in aid to various Muslim organizations throughout the world.[45] During the year, Nasif traveled extensively, disbursing financial support in his ever-widening wake. A former geology professor, Nasif cut the figure of a young and able technocrat who did not feign theological expertise and who wore Western suits while traveling in Europe and the Americas. With Nasif's management style and a sleek new headquarters, the MWL entered an era in which the medium mattered nearly as much as the message in spreading the word to the faithful.

The mission carried much more weight than in the bygone days of the 1970s, when the MWL had divided much of the field with Egypt. It now faced stiff competition from Iran and Libya, and had to use ever more advanced means of communication in order to be heard above the cacophony of Islamic preaching by others. But the MWL's activism rested upon the assumption that most Muslims could be convinced that Saudi Islam represented normative Islam, provided the Saudis could portray themselves effectively as guardians of Islam's holy cities and preeminent patrons of Islam everywhere.

This meant a high profile wherever Muslims were besieged. The Saudis could offer little military support to threatened Muslims, but they could demonstrate the alternative solidarity of the checkbook. For example, in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, the MWL was represented by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Shaykh Sa'd al-Din al-'Alami.[46] Through him and others, the MWL financed much of the restoration of the Hasan Bey Mosque between Tel Aviv and Jaffa, and provided maintenance support for other mosques, including al-Aqsa in Jerusalem.[47] It also financed the creation of the first Islamic studies college in Israel.[48] Israeli authorities reportedly turned a blind eye to this outside funding because the PLO was not involved[49] — this, despite the MWL's longstanding relationship with Yasir 'Arafat, who often attended the annual meeting of the MWL's governing constituent council, and who did so again in 1986.[50] There were countless other examples of the MWL's philanthropic involvement in places where Muslims were in the minority or under threat. This solicitude was celebrated during the sixth international conference of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), which met in Riyadh from 22–27 January 1986, and which devoted itself wholly to the plight of Muslim minorities. Established in 1972, WAMY organized conferences, published books and tracts, and ran six permanent youth camps — in Northern Cyprus, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil.[51]

In yet another demonstration of Muslim solidarity, Saudi Arabia sponsored a special committee to aid Afghan refugees in Pakistan. During its first two years, this committee, headed by the Governor of Riyadh, Prince Salman Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, spent 539m Pakistani rupees on foodstuffs, tents, blankets, and clothes for the refugees. By Saudi estimate, this constituted half of the total international and regional aid that flowed to the refugees. The committee's representatives in Pakistan,

operating through the Saudi Red Crescent, also ran clinics, orphanages, homes for the disabled, and workshops.[52] This aid complemented Saudi support for the Afghan armed struggle (see *MECS* 1984–85, p 150). There were also some Arab Muslim volunteers in Afghan resistance ranks, who appeared to be mostly Saudis or Saudi-sponsored.[53]

Another form of solicitude for besieged Muslims consisted of special awards for prominent foreign Muslims who lent credibility to Saudi claims. The annual Faysal International Prize for Service to Islam, carrying a cash award of SR350,000, represented the most prestigious distinction of this kind. In 1986 the prize was divided between two recipients.[54] Ahmad Deedat, head of the Islamic Propagation Center in Durban, South Africa, hailed originally from Gujarat, and specialized in publicly debating Christian missionaries. He even challenged Pope John Paul II to a public debate in St Peter's Square — a challenge the Pope preferred not to answer.[55] Deedat instead debated lesser representatives of the rival faith, sometimes before as many as 7,000 listeners in London's Royal Albert Hall.[56] He shared the award with Roger Garaudy, a leading French intellectual of the Left who had converted to Islam a few years earlier, and then took up the political cause of Islam with a convert's zeal.

International Islamic banking represented another area in which Saudi entrepreneurs played a leading role. The underlying assumption of all Islamic banking was that no conflict existed between the principles of Islam and personal enrichment, provided such enrichment did not violate explicit provisions of Islamic law. The most important provision was Islam's banning of usurious lending, understood as the lending of any sum at a fixed rate of interest. Islamic banks employed a variety of circuitous techniques to satisfy this legal requirement. The market leader in international Islamic banking (aside from the ICO's own governmental IDB; see above), was the Dar al-Maal al-Islami (DMI), formed as a trust in 1981 under the laws of the Bahamas and operating in Geneva under Swiss law as a management company. DMI organized ventures in banking, insurance, and investment, through 22 subsidiaries in 12 countries. Its net assets at the end of fiscal year 1985 stood at $280m. The moving spirit behind DMI was Saudi Prince Muhammad al-Faysal Al Sa'ud. In his view, Islamic banking had "passed the stage of gaining expertise and [is] now capable of handling all economic problems and finding Islamic solutions for them."[57] His own DMI had cleaned house after its former chief executive, Ibrahim Kamil, had lost some $28m in the trading of precious metals. (On the DMI's development and difficulties, see *MECS* 1982–83, p 247; 1983–84, p 166; 1984–85, p 150.) In 1986, Kamil (who had already left his post as chief executive) resigned from the DMI's 18-member Board of Supervisors, although he still held an 8 per cent interest in the company. The Sudanese leader of the *Umma* Party (and later in the year Prime Minister) Sadiq al-Mahdi, also asked that his term as a board member not be renewed, apparently because of criticism in Sudan that the DMI was more interested in profit than in the welfare of the communities it claimed to serve.[58] But the DMI continued to claim that it operated wholly in accord with Islamic law, and that competitors "may not really be Islamic."[59]

Ibrahim Kamil meanwhile reappeared as the founder of the Geneva-based Dar Tadine al-Umma (DTU). This enterprise proposed to mine "Islamic gold dinars" and "Islamic silver dirhams" from the neighborhood of disused mines in Tanzania. As one analyst commented, "this sort of investment might well be worth speculation in the

form of risk capital from wealthy investors. But it certainly does not look like the sort of thing a devout Muslim should plough his life savings into for the sake of his widow and children."[60] The DTU had to go to great lengths to establish that speculative trade in precious metals was even permissible in Islam.[61]

By now it was apparent that international Islamic banking had no more social conscience than any other kind of international banking. Its aim was to make profits for depositors and investors while adhering to the letter of Islamic law. And since Islamic banks had to create depositor confidence, they generally shunned investment in long-term development projects, preferring the security of trade financing. In this respect, Islamic banks helped fuel current consumption rather than long-term development. Finally, there was the question of just how "Islamic" the banks really were. Each bank retained one or more salaried "experts" whose task was to assure the bank's compliance with Islamic law. Muslim critics of the banks claimed that these persons issued debatable rulings that stretched the limits of the law, and that they could not do otherwise, since they were paid functionaries of the very banks they regulated. One possible solution mentioned in this debate was an independent, international supervisory board of Muslim scholars.[62] Without such regulation, international Islamic banking provided a rather wide arena for dubious banking practices.

## EGYPT'S SUPPORTING ROLE

Egypt's role in propagating the message of a moderate Islam remained a modest one. With the Egyptian Government embattled at home by a burgeoning Fundamentalism, the diffusion abroad of Egypt's state-oriented version of Islam did not rank high on the list of priorities submitted by the regime to its clerics. Indeed, it seemed that much of the burden had been shifted to Saudi Arabia, which commanded more substantial resources.

But the Shaykh al-Azhar, Jadd al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd al-Haqq, did see himself as the first among believers, and in late 1985 and 1986 he embarked on several tours of other countries, including Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. During these trips, he sought to defend Egypt's policy from an Islamic point of view, and to attack Egypt's opponents from an Islamic angle. When asked in Bangladesh about the Egyptian-Israeli relationship, he declared that it was in accord with Islam, since a Muslim ruler could conclude a truce with a non-Muslim enemy; by the Egyptian-Israeli accords, Egypt received territory while Israel got no more than a piece of paper.[63]

On the other hand, by severely criticizing Khomeyni, the Shaykh al-Azhar entered into a headlong controversy with critics of the Egyptian regime. Jadd al-Haqq openly declared that the phenomenon of "Khomeynism" was remote from true Islam, and contradicted the Islamic principle of "no coercion in religion."[64] In taking this position, the Shaykh al-Azhar pitted his authority against Khomeyni's. But even in Egypt there were those who found Jadd al-Haqq wanting in the comparison. One critic pointed out that Khomeyni ruled by the will of the people while the Shaykh al-Azhar was an appointee. Khomeyni rid Iran of the Shah, cut off Israel's oil, and thwarted the superpowers. But what had the Shaykh al-Azhar done? "What did he do when the *Shari'a* law was abolished? Or when the Islamic *waqf*s were nationalized? Or when religious men were whipped?... Why didn't he protest, or speak out? Indeed

what does he do in al-Azhar now?"[65] This kind of debate reflected the deeper rivalry between Egypt and Iran, as each sought to end its political isolation by maneuvering in the Arab expanse that separated them. In this contest, the Shaykh al-Azhar became the pivotal man in articulating Egypt's notion of a pluralistic Islam, daring to say about Iran what Saudi clerics only mumbled to themselves. But Jadd al-Haqq was not wholly compliant. In addition to his outspoken criticism of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, he did not hesitate to denounce Israel for its alleged designs upon Muslim holy places in Jerusalem.[66] The challenge facing al-Azhar and its Shaykh was to preserve their traditional standing in Islam, to serve the regime, and to retain some credibility with radicals at a moment of growing radicalism. It remained to be seen whether these divergent goals could be achieved at one and the same time.

## IRAN: TRIUMPH OF MODERATION?

From its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran professed a commitment to a policy of encouraging Islamic movements abroad by a variety of means. Sometimes it employed campaigns of propaganda, at other times operations of armed subversion. Iran's prolonged war with Iraq made it necessary to moderate that policy in some parts of the Muslim world, where Iran feared that too aggressive an Iranian posture might work to Iraq's advantage. In the Gulf, Iran shelved plans for promoting Islamic revolution, lest the Gulf regimes recoil into the embrace of Iraq. But in more remote Lebanon, Iran invested great resources in supporting a movement bent upon establishing an Islamic Republic of Lebanon. (For the development of Iran's pan-Islamic policy, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp 288–92; 1982–83, pp 238–43; 1983–84, pp 167–74; 1984–85, pp 151–60.)[67]

As 1986 drew to a close, confusion clouded the issue of Iranian policy intentions, as a result of revelations about US-Iranian negotiations for the release of American hostages held by Iranian-backed Shi'is in Lebanon. (For other assessments of these negotiations, see chapter on Iran and essay on the US and the Middle East.) In the wake of the revelations, the US Administration maintained that the initial purpose of these contacts was not to strike an arms-for-hostages deal, but to reach out to Iranian "moderates." Was there a moderate camp in Iran, prepared to forgo an aggressive policy of exporting revolution to Lebanon and elsewhere in return for improved relations with the US? Or was the Iranian response to American overtures a calculated, short-term tactic, sanctioned by Imam Khomeyni, with the aim of gaining sorely needed hardware in a straightforward exchange for the release of American hostages?

Such questions had no unequivocal answers. Iranian Prime Minister Mir Husayn Musavi, addressing queries regarding Iran's alleged policy of exporting revolution, struck this note:

> What they call the export of revolution is in fact an effort to defend Islam everywhere. At present there are 40 foreign radio stations active against the Islamic Republic of Iran in an attempt to export their own culture and beliefs to our country. No one says anything when the US wants to export its culture to our country... If the export of revolution means that we proclaim the message that the dignity of Muslims depends on their return to Islam, then we accept that we export the revolution. But if it means intervention in the internal affairs and provocation of other countries, or that we intend to export arms to other countries, we deny this.[68]

Such statements recalled earlier remarks by *Majlis* Speaker 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Iranian President Muhammad 'Ali Khameneh'i, disavowing the use of force in foreign policy, and asserting the "cultural" nature of Iran's "export" of Islam.[69] In the past, such statements had been interpreted by many observers as Iranian dissimulation, meant to erect a high wall of deniability between Iran and violent acts liable to bring retaliation. But in late 1985 and into 1986, such statements were subjected by US and Israeli officials to a systematic reinterpretation, and were read differently, as signals of a genuine Iranian willingness to improve relations with the US. And indeed, these three — Rafsanjani, Musavi, and Khameneh'i — directed the Iranian official who dealt with US emissary Robert McFarlane during his ill-fated mission to Tehran in May 1986. They were supposedly at the head of a "moderate" camp, and capable of enforcing restraint upon "radicals" who were otherwise prepared to terrorize and plot foreign revolution by any and all means. They reportedly enjoyed the backing of Khomeyni's son Ahmad, who played an increasingly important role in mediating the wishes of his ailing father.[70] But the "moderates" could not advocate their cause too boldly because, as McFarlane concluded, "they still cannot overcome their more immediate problem of how to talk to us and stay alive."[71]

The opposing "radical" camp was led by Ayatollah Husayn 'Ali Montazeri, Khomeyni's heir-apparent, who had taken upon himself the wider dissemination of the revolution's message in order to bolster his claim to the succession. (For Montazeri's role in the formulation of this policy, see *MECS* 1984–85, pp 151–53.)[72] One of Montazeri's principal aides in this task was Sayyid Mehdi Hashemi, head of the Liberation Movements' Department of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Mehdi Hashemi reportedly operated a training camp in North Tehran where Iranians as well as foreign Muslim volunteers and refugees underwent intensive ideological indoctrination in preparation for special operations. Before the revolution, Mehdi Hashemi was sentenced to death for the murder of an Isfahan cleric who had criticized Montazeri over a controversial matter of theology.[73] But his execution was stayed, and he was released following the revolution. Mehdi Hashemi owed his precipitous rise to his brother, Sayyid Hadi Hashemi, Montazeri's son-in-law and chief of Montazeri's bureau. Khomeyni himself reportedly paid frequent visits to Mehdi Hashemi's training camp, located only half a kilometer from the Imam's Tehran home. He also maintained bases of operation in his native Isfahan and in Qom.[74] Other advocates of an aggressive policy were Minister of Interior 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemipur, a former Iranian Ambassador to Syria who was recalled after Syrian complaints that he overstepped his bounds; and Ayatollah Fazlollah Mahallati, Khomeyni's special representative to the Supreme Council of the IRGC. (Mahallati perished in February 1986 in the downing of an Iranian airliner as it toured the Iranian-Iraqi war front.)[75] Also among the hard-liners was Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Musavi-Kho'iniha, Prosecutor-General of Iran, former spiritual mentor of the students who seized US diplomats in Tehran, and past representative of the Imam to the pilgrimage. He had been removed from this last post as part of Rafsanjani's effort to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, since Kho'iniha had done much to incite Iranian pilgrims to confrontation (see *MECS* 1984–85, p 162). Montazeri also sponsored what various reports described as a Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Council, about which few verifiable details were known. It was said to operate under the direction of Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrasi, the

brilliantly eloquent leader of the Tehran-based Islamic Action Organization (*Munazzamat al-'Amal al-Islami*). (On the Council and Mudarrasi, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp 171, 173–74; 1984–85, p 152; and below). The Council's Committee for Europe, where it established most of its ties with foreign Muslims, reportedly used London and Rome as its principal bases.[76] Other reports mentioned Iran's embassy and consulates in West Germany as bases of operation.[77]

Divisiveness over the export of revolution was said to parallel the larger split between Montazeri and Rafsanjani over the future course of Iran's domestic and foreign policies — a split denied by both men, and difficult to measure, since Khomeyni's lingering presence inhibited any open airing of differences.[78] Rafsanjani himself dismissed rampant media speculation about the supposed split: "They cannot understand our relations with Ayatollah Montazeri as our former teacher, present successor to our leader, and our future leader. They think our relations are similar to their political relations in the West."[79] That may have been true, but Rafsanjani and Montazeri did nothing to present their own authoritative account of these relations, allowing free reign to speculation in Iran and abroad (see chapter on Iran). Certainly Montazeri, Rafsanjani, and many other persons in high positions of responsibility thought it essential that Iran should continue to develop close ties with Muslim movements abroad, and agreed that the sympathies and allegiances of other Muslims, Shi'is and Sunnis, constituted a valuable asset in the pursuit of any foreign policy. But they seemed to differ considerably over the ends which these alliances were to serve, and whether the international network created by Iranian efforts should employ violence as a matter of course.

This issue came to a head with the 12 October 1986 arrest of Mehdi Hashemi and many of his collaborators (numbering between 40 and 200). Much uncertainty surrounded the role of Mehdi Hashemi, who would eventually be accused of every kind of malfeasance, from murder and kidnapping to collaboration with the former secret police (SAVAK) and subversion.[80] Perhaps more important was the fact that Mehdi Hashemi had taken many independent (and violent) initiatives which cut across the grain of Rafsanjani's attempts to give nuance to Iran's regional and foreign policies.[81] These initiatives allegedly included an unauthorized attempt to disrupt the pilgrimage in a bid to thwart Rafsanjani's *rapprochement* with Saudi Arabia (see below); and the one-day kidnapping in Tehran of the Syrian chargé d'affaires, in apparent retaliation for Syrian-imposed restraints on Iranian activities in Lebanon.[82] By striking back at Mehdi Hashemi, Rafsanjani and his supporters sought to wrest control of Iran's regional network from Montazeri's personal office, and make it subject to collective decision-making. A central figure in this effort was Iran's Intelligence Minister, Muhammad Muhammadi-Reyshahri (son-in-law of the influential Ayatollah 'Ali Meshkini), who saw Mehdi Hashemi's operation as a competing bureaucracy, and who led the assault against him. During 1986, Reyshahri established an intelligence college, which reportedly enrolled 50–60 students from Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, alongside some 200 Iranians.[83] This may have been created as a counterpoint to Mehdi Hashemi's operations in Tehran, Qom, and Isfahan. And it was Reyshahri who amassed the evidence against Mehdi Hashemi and orchestrated his arrest. Even a rare visit by Montazeri to Tehran failed to secure Hashemi's release,[84] and the arrests were generally interpreted as a blow to Montazeri's near-monopoly in the promotion of Islamic liberation abroad.

But Mehdi Hashemi's fall did not deliver his network straight into his rivals' hands. His supporters took their revenge by leaking word of US-Iranian contacts and the McFarlane mission. These revelations, made to a Lebanese weekly by Hadi Hashemi,[85] embarrassed Rafsanjani, who was compelled to conduct a public campaign of self-defense on his own behalf. Rafsanjani ultimately landed on his feet. According to reports, a December 1986 meeting attended by Montazeri, Rafsanjani, Khameneh'i, Musavi, and Reyshahri resolved to centralize all contacts with Iran's foreign Muslim supporters in Tehran, under the supervision of the Foreign Ministry.[86] (It was not clear whether this affected the position of Iran's Ministry of Islamic Guidance, entrusted by Khomeyni with disseminating Iran's "cultural" as distinct from "political" influence.) On the face of it, this strengthening of the Foreign Ministry appeared to undermine Montazeri's position. It was certainly resented by the radical students at Tehran University, who charged the Foreign Ministry with abandoning the revolutionary policy of seeking relations with peoples rather than governments. Islamic groups at the university issued a scathing critique of the Foreign Ministry after the revelations about US-Iranian negotiations, affirming that "the proper way to fight is through establishing relations with the liberation movements, building cadres and striking out against the US in all areas. The successful phenomenon in Lebanon called *Hizballah* supports this view. Three years ago, *Hizballah* did not exist in Lebanon, but at present, this movement is one of the most influential factors in the issues of Lebanon and the region."[87]

But later reports claimed that the Foreign Ministry's coordination with Muslim liberation movements elsewhere had been entrusted to Ayatollah Hadi Khosrowshahi, Iran's former Ambassador to the Vatican, who was suspected by Western intelligence circles of having established a clandestine European network of Muslim extremists based in Rome. (For Khosrowshahi's past activities, see *MECS* 1984–85, p 160.)[88] If Khosrowshahi had indeed succeeded Mehdi Hashemi, this seemed to represent a compromise between Montazeri and Rafsanjani. As a militant cleric, Khosrowshahi could be expected to pursue his task with the zealotry favored by Montazeri; but by placing Khosrowshahi in the Foreign Ministry, he could nevertheless be held accountable before Rafsanjani and Khameneh'i, through Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati.

By the close of 1986, control of Iran's export of Islam had become a contested issue. Those favoring restraint in Iran's policy, such as Rafsanjani, had gained ground, but they could not exclude Montazeri from the enterprise. The possibility that their differences might spill over into the wider world of Iran's sympathizers also remained strong, and was realized during the year in Lebanon, the most important foreign proving ground for Iran's message of Islamic revival and revolution.

## IRAN AND LEBANON'S ISLAMIC REPUBLICANS

Iranian leaders often boasted of their growing "influence" in Lebanon, an influence exercised primarily through Lebanese Shi'is who professed varying degrees of allegiance to the revolutionary message of Imam Khomeyni. That influence approximated direct control in the case of some Shi'is organized in the Iranian-inspired framework of *Hizballah*. Other Shi'is within *Hizballah* did not answer to Iran, but they did generally respond to Iranian moral and material incentives.[89] Indeed, even within the purely Lebanese *Amal* movement, with its formal professions of Lebanese

Nationalism and its alliance with Syria, there were many rank-and-file members who looked for guidance from Iran. Most remarkable of all, Iran had succeeded in extending its influence into the Sunni bastion of Tripoli, by assiduous cultivation of Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban, leader of the Islamic Unification Movement (*Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami*), who also advocated the transformation of Lebanon into an Islamic republic. (On the growth of Iran's influence in Lebanon, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp 171–73; 1984–85, pp 155–59.)

But Iran's Lebanese clients were sorely divided over whether they should work for this transformation immediately, in the teeth of opposition from Lebanese Christians and secularists, or base their appeal upon a gradual campaign of persuasion. The most impatient of Iran's friends in *Hizballah* went so far as to call for the open declaration of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon, centered in Ba'albak, the former resort town in Lebanon's Biqa' valley which had been transformed into a bastion of radical Shi'ism by the presence of an IRGC contingent. So eager were these zealots that they even printed postage stamps in the name of the Islamic Republic of Lebanon, and these began to appear on letters mailed from the town.[90] But no new regime was declared during 1986, due to the opposition of certain Lebanese Shi'i leaders who doubted whether *Hizballah* enjoyed the kind of support necessary to make a revolution. This view found its most articulate expression in the speeches and interviews of Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the prominent Beirut-based Shi'i cleric who claimed a wide following (but no formal position) in *Hizballah*. This stand put Fadlallah at odds with Montazeri, but he remained in Rafsanjani's good graces. (On Fadlallah's views, see *MECS* 1984–85, pp 155, 157–58.)[91]

Iranian leaders in 1986 aimed at strengthening their hold over their Lebanese clients, and educating them to view their own predicament through an Iranian prism. One approach was to bring Lebanese sympathizers on political pilgrimages to Iran. The fourth annual Conference on Islamic Thought, which met in Tehran from 29–31 January 1986, provided just such an opportunity. In the past, the conference had served the general purpose of showing Iranian hospitality to sympathetic Muslims, in the expectation that they would speak well of Iran upon their return home. This time the event was aimed more deliberately at bringing some of Iran's Lebanese sympathizers into Rafsanjani's orbit.

Fadlallah attended; he had not been invited to Iran for some time because of his open disagreements with Montazeri. Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din represented another important acquisition for Rafsanjani. As head of Lebanon's Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council, he could be said to represent the Shi'i community of Lebanon in a legal sense, although the extent of his real influence within the community was uncertain. Shams al-Din once maintained a steadfast independence from Iran. As recently as 1983, he had declared that "the Shi'i Muslims in Lebanon have always been Lebanese first... every sect in Lebanon at some time in its history has resorted to calling for help from an outside foreign power — with the exception of the Shi'i Muslims, who have always been loyal and sincere to Lebanon. Lebanon is their native land. When dealing with matters concerning Lebanon, their premises are always purely Lebanese."[92] This assessment now seemed hopelessly out of date, as Shams al-Din himself became a regular visitor to Iran, where he made three appearances in 1986. But while his own premises were no longer purely Lebanese, neither were they purely Iranian, and he carefully preserved his independent standing.[93] Also in

attendance were Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin, *Hizballah's* spokesman in Beirut, and Husayn al-Musawi, leader of the Ba'albak-based Islamic *Amal*.[94] These last two figures were self-avowed servants of Iran who openly disclaimed any predilection for independent judgment. As Ibrahim al-Amin explained, he owed his loyalty to Khomeyni exclusively. "Our connection with Imam Khomeyni regarding executive and practical matters is, of course, carried out through the command of the revolution, which is our command."[95] Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban was also on Iran's guest list, but Syria apparently blocked his departure for the conference.

Fadlallah and Shams al-Din actually addressed the conference; several persons spoke on behalf of Iran, including Khameneh'i, Rafsanjani, and Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of the Islamic Propagation Organization (*Sazmane Tablighate Islami*), who had visited Lebanon twice in 1985.[96] Montazeri's absence suggested that Rafsanjani, Khameneh'i, and Jannati saw this as their own forum for consolidating their influence in Lebanon, particularly through Shi'i leaders like Fadlallah and Shams al-Din who recoiled from Montazeri's appeals for the immediate establishment of an Islamic government in Lebanon. Although the final resolutions did call in a general way for the establishment of Islamic governments throughout the world, they made no explicit reference to Lebanon, while other causes — Palestine, the Iraqi-Iranian war, and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan — were all addressed in specific terms.[97] During the conference, Rafsanjani apparently assured Lebanese Shi'i leaders that they need not preach the immediate transformation of Lebanon into an Islamic Republic in order to enjoy Iran's continued support.

This found confirmation in remarks made during and after the conference. Fadlallah continued to preach patience. Establishing an Islamic republic would not be a "picnic," he said, for "the objective conditions do not exist for the implementation of an Islamic government in Lebanon." The majority of Lebanese, or at least the majority of Lebanese Muslims, first had to be won over to the idea.[98] Shams al-Din, talking of the plan for an Islamic government in Lebanon, defended the right of its advocates to speak their minds, but "concerning practical implementation, we must say that it is not presently practical to implement this plan."[99] Even Islamic *Amal* leader Husayn al-Musawi criticized "those excited brothers who want us to behave as if the conditions are like those after the revolution in Iran ... as if we have achieved victory. The conditions are different in Iran and Lebanon. The nature of the society in Lebanon and the nature of its Muslims are very different from those in Iran." On account of these differences, "no person, Lebanese or Iranian, believes that what can happen in Tehran can also occur in Beirut." In Musawi's view, "to present a plan for the formation of an Islamic republic is not proper at present."[100] This cautious realism represented an about-face for Musawi, prompted by Rafsanjani's personal encouragement. Montazeri perhaps now realized the need for a temporary retreat. When Fadlallah and Shams al-Din met with him during their stay, he did not admonish them to preach revolution, but simply urged them to foster unity.[101]

Rafsanjani received important Lebanese Shi'i support in return for his stand. During the year, Fadlallah declared Rafsanjani "undoubtedly the thinking head of state."[102] He also gave his endorsement to the admissibility of collective leadership by Muslim jurisprudents — a position known to correspond to that of Montazeri's critics. And even while professing a voluntary fidelity to Khomeyni, Fadlallah asserted that it was perfectly legitimate for the different regions of the Shi'i world to submit to

the final authority of different jurisprudents.[103] By these statements, Fadlallah prepared his theoretical grounds for standing up to Montazeri, should Montazeri indeed succeed Khomeyni as Iran's "leader."

The long-term implications of these developments were unclear. However, they did confirm that Lebanon's Islamic Republicans had a tendency to factionalism along lines that coincided with the fissures in Iran's own Islamic Republican Party (IRP). Like the ruling IRP, *Hizballah* was a coalition with a single purpose, but it was a coalition nonetheless. It brought Fadlallah and his following, with their strong streak of independence, into an alliance with new converts to the cause who professed unflinching allegiance to Iranian emissaries. During the early years of Iran's involvement in Lebanon, Montazeri sought to channel all contacts with Iran's Lebanese clients through persons who answered to him, and particularly through Mehdi Hashemi. But the important visits to Iran by Lebanese Shi'i leaders in early 1986 broke Montazeri's virtual monopoly, and opened the Lebanese arena to a wider variety of Iranian players.

This development was abetted by the October 1986 demise of Mehdi Hashemi (see above). His disgrace, the consequence of his alleged (and later self-admitted) "deviation," seemed still further evidence of Montazeri's loosening grip on Iranian activities in Lebanon. Fadlallah welcomed this development. He announced that Mehdi Hashemi's demise did not mean that the Iranian institutions assisting the "liberation" of other Muslims would be disbanded. It did mean that Iran's "struggle against Imperialism" would proceed "in a studied and rational manner."[104] Immediately after Mehdi Hashemi's removal, his Beirut collaborator, Iranian chargé d'affaires Mahmud Nurani, was recalled to Tehran for consultations, and Iran announced that it would appoint Ahmad Dastmalchiyan its first Ambassador to Lebanon in four years.[105] This seemed to be yet another maneuver to circumscribe the influence of Montazeri in Lebanon, and to tighten Iran's grip on its Lebanese Shi'i clients.

But with Mehdi Hashemi's fall and the revelations about Iran's dealings with the US, other Lebanese Shi'is became furious, particularly the hostage-holders in *Hizballah,* who made it clear that they would no longer answer Iranian requests to yield hostages. The American hostages were held by 'Imad Mughniyya, a *Hizballah* military commander in Beirut, who was one of four persons indicted in the US for involvement in the June 1985 hijacking of a TWA airliner to Beirut (see *MECS* 1984–85, essay on armed operations).[106] He was also the brother-in-law of a Shi'i condemned to death in Kuwait for involvement in the December 1983 bomb attacks against the US embassy and other installations (see *MECS* 1983–84, pp 405–6). Mughniyya, operating under the cover of Islamic Jihad (*al-Jihad al-Islami*), had seized American hostages in Beirut in order to secure the release of the Kuwait prisoners. But by pressure and deception, Iranians involved in the dealings with the US had managed to part Mughniyya from some of his hostages without delivering any of the Kuwait prisoners. Once the details of the arms-for-hostages deal became public, an angered Mughniyya broke his ties with the Iranians, who had so obviously used his hostage-taking for their own ends. Mughniyya apparently took additional hostages (including would-be mediator Terence Waite), and reports had it that Iranian emissaries were no longer able to locate their disgruntled protégé.[107] As a result, Rafsanjani lost his leverage in the arms-for-hostages game. He still offered to

use his exhausted "influence" for release of the remaining hostages in exchange for the continued flow of US arms. But he could no longer control the most radical of Iran's clients in Lebanon, who viewed his dealings with the US (and Israel) as so much treason against the creed of Islamic Republicanism.

The hostage issue also complicated Iran's and *Hizballah*'s relations with Syria. Throughout the year, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad pressured *Hizballah* for the release of foreign hostages, discovering only belatedly that the hostages were being held by "a small group outside [*Hizballah*'s] control."[108] The resulting tension highlighted Iran's vulnerability in Lebanon: Iran's supply lines to its Lebanese clients ran through Syria, and Syria appeared increasingly anxious over the growth of *Hizballah*. Time and again, Syria and *Hizballah* found themselves on the brink of conflict, as the "war of the camps" pitted Syrian-backed *Amal* militiamen against Palestinian fighters in areas adjacent to *Hizballah* enclaves. Fearful of Syrian encroachment in Beirut, *Hizballah* tilted toward the Palestinians, and numerous Iranian mediators appeared in Lebanon to promote a settlement that would forestall a Syrian-imposed solution. In the middle of the year, Iran also dispatched a new Ambassador to Damascus, Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Hasan Akhtari, as part of the intensification of diplomatic contacts between Syria and Iran regarding Lebanon. (The post of Ambassador had been vacant for nine months, as the Syrians reportedly turned down three of Iran's nominees for the post.) While Rafsanjani seemed anxious to keep Iran's disagreements with Syria under wraps, Khameneh'i spoke of them freely, and was particularly incensed over Syria's treatment of *Hizballah* and Syrian overtures to Jordan. Nor did he hesitate to raise the matter of Syria's unpaid oil debt to Iran, put at $1.675 bn. There was even a period during the summer when Iran suspended its oil shipments to Syria, in order to gain more diplomatic leverage.[109] That the distrust-ridden Syrian-Iranian alliance lasted for yet another year remained something of a miracle, explicable only by the animosity toward Iraq shared by the two States, and the role played by Iran in promoting a war of insurgency against Israel and Israel's Lebanese clients in South Lebanon. (See also chapters on Iran; Syria.)

The Islamic Resistance (*al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya*) represented to the southern struggle against Israel what Islamic Jihad represented to the campaign to purge Beirut of foreigners. In fact, these were both pseudonyms for *Hizballah*, which enjoyed much Iranian support in extending its reach to the South. *Hizballah* rallied around the rejection of resurrected United Nations' Resolution 425 (dating from March 1978). This it regarded as implicit recognition of Israel's right to exist, since the resolution explicitly recognized Israel's right to a secure Lebanese frontier. In this respect, *Hizballah* differed markedly from *Amal*, which accepted the need for security guarantees in return for an Israeli departure from the South.[110] This difference of opinion aggravated the tendency of *Amal* and *Hizballah* to clash.[111] More important, the *Hizballah*-backed Islamic Resistance launched numerous attacks against Israeli forces and the Israeli-backed South Lebanese Army, and also against the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which it regarded as an impediment to prosecution of the *jihad*. The growing frequency and effectiveness of these attacks were acknowledged by Israel and UNIFIL.[112] (See also essay on armed operations and chapter on Lebanon.)

But the IRGC contingent in Ba'albak, numbering about 800 persons, did not join in the southern fighting in 1986, confining its role to training and indoctrination.[113] On

this account (and because of the possible presence of American hostages in its midst), the contingent enjoyed an immunity from Israeli retaliation. Iran also invited 158 southern Shi'i *mujahidun* freed from Israel's 'Atlit prison to visit Iran, where they made professions of devotion to their hosts.[114]

The resistance in the South did not depend entirely upon the support of Iran. Neither did the growth of *Hizballah*. Both drew upon the conditions of internal disorder and foreign intervention that had plagued Lebanon for over a decade. But the material and moral support of Iran hastened the ascent of Lebanon's Islamic Republicans, and inspired them with confidence in the inevitability of their own triumph, even as many of their rivals sank into despair. By the year's end, the combination of Iran and *Hizballah* had come to preoccupy Israel, Syria, and much of the West.

## IRAN AND THE IRAQI SHI'I OPPOSITION

Iran's policies toward Shi'i communities elsewhere in the Arab world varied widely. Iran could not give support to Shi'i opposition movements on the Arab side of the Gulf without driving conservative Arab regimes completely into the Iraqi camp. But Iran had always given strong encouragement to Iraqi Shi'i exile groups based in Tehran. (For the groups referred to below and their differences, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp 170–71, 483.) Iraqi Shi'is associated with the exiles overstepped their bounds in 1985 by pursuing their campaign against Iraq into Kuwait, in a round of terrorism that ultimately embarrassed Iran (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp 153–54). In early 1986, the Iranian authorities sought to redirect the zeal of these groups to fighting the war itself, in part by mobilizing specifically Iraqi units for the battle. Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, leader of the Iraqi Shi'i *al-Da'wa* movement and head of the Tehran-based Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), planned to have such units placed in "liberated" regions of Iraq, and also sought recruits among the many Iraqi prisoners of war in Iranian camps.[115] This campaign was not unrelated to the difficulties faced by Iran in finding recruits for the war. SAIRI even extended its recruitment campaign to Damascus, where many Iraqi Shi'is lived in exile.[116]

But a disharmony could be detected in the Iraqi Shi'i opposition, over the question of who would lead the anticipated triumphal return to Iraq: Baqir al-Hakim or Islamic Action's Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrasi. The former represented an autonomous Iraqi Shi'i revolutionism that predated Iran's own revolution: Baqir al-Hakim saw himself as an equal partner, not a servant, of the Islamic Republic of Iran. And in according the very highest priority to Iraq's liberation, he sought to channel his movement's resources into conventional warfare on the front. This served as his principal credential for future leadership. In contrast, Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrasi placed himself at the service of any cause which his hosts assigned him, and his small following included all sorts of Muslim revolutionaries who had congregated in Tehran.[117] Bombings and assassinations constituted Islamic Action's contribution to the war effort. The group carried out its operations not on the front but in Baghdad and elsewhere in the Iraqi rear, where Islamic Action also distributed Khomeyni's speeches and photographs.[118]

During 1986, these two rivals exchanged subtle accusations. In particular, persons associated with *al-Da'wa* accused Islamic Action of fabricating events described in its

military communiqués. The actions carried out by its "martyrs" allegedly never took place, and members of Islamic Action who claimed to be engaged in clandestine work were actually evading service at the war front.[119] Islamic Action replied by questioning the loyalty of *al-Da'wa* to Khomeyni and his designated heir, Montazeri. *Al-Da'wa*'s critics could point to the fact that a few members of *al-Da'wa* had even left the organization to establish an Iraqi *Hizballah*, more faithful to the "line of the Imam."[120] And it was undoubtedly true that some *Da'wa* activists found Tehran stifling. One of the Hakim brothers, Mahdi al-Hakim, a leading figure in *al-Da'wa*, left Iran for Britain, supposedly out of resentment against Iran's overbearing attitude toward his movement. These controversies left little doubt that the Iraqi Shi'i opposition based in Tehran also represented an uneasy coalition. Like the Lebanese *Hizballah*, its wings also aligned themselves with the various contending factions in Iran. Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrasi was close to Montazeri and Mehdi Hashemi, through his former association with Montazeri's late son, Muhammad. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim took an independent stand between Montazeri and Rafsanjani, and had a close relationship with Lebanon's Fadlallah, to whom Baqir al-Hakim was also linked by family ties.

The interrelated mesh of Shi'i alliances, which transcended all borders, came into play again following France's forced repatriation of two Iraqi Shi'i oppositionists to Iraq, in March 1986. The two had been arrested after the terrorist attacks in Paris on 12 February 1986, which led to the deportation of 13 persons to various countries.[121] False reports indicated that the Iraqi authorities had immediately executed one of the returned prisoners. The Tehran-based groups could do little in retaliation, but Lebanese Shi'is could, and they promptly claimed to have retaliated by executing Michel Seurat, a French academic taken hostage while conducting research in Beirut.[122] They also kidnapped a French television crew in Beirut, in order to secure the return of the two Iraqis to France.[123]

Iran made a serious effort to heal the divisions in the Iraqi opposition by having SAIRI convene a Conference of Solidarity with the Iraqi People, which met in Tehran from 24–27 December 1986. This gathering reportedly brought over 90 Iraqi dissidents, residing mostly in Britain and Syria, back to Tehran, in the hope of ending their differences with leaders of the Iraqi Shi'i opposition in Iran. Iraqi Shi'i and Kurdish activists abroad feared that Iran planned to annex Iraq to a greater Islamic Republic; one aim of the conference would be to alleviate their apprehensions. To assist in the effort, SAIRI also summoned its Lebanese Shi'i friends: Fadlallah, Shams al-Din, Husayn al-Musawi, Ibrahim al-Amin, and Subhi al-Tufayli all arrived in Tehran for the conference.[124] According to reports, 423 persons participated in the event. It was addressed by Khomeyni in the mosque next to his Tehran home. Khameneh'i gave the crucial assurances: following the victory of Iranian arms, "recognized international borders between us and Iraq would remain in effect, and the political future of Iraq, which is something that should be decided by the people of that country, should be settled in such a way that would guarantee its territorial integrity."[125] The resolutions, which called for "escalation" of Iran's war with Iraq until final victory, also stressed the need to preserve Iraq's "territorial integrity." The conference proceeded to establish a "special commission for evaluation of the future government of Iraq," composed of Iraqis and charged with drafting a future constitution for an Islamic Iraq.[126] When Montazeri met the delegates, he urged them to show "greater unity."[127]

The fact that Montazeri had to plead for "greater unity" from Iran's Lebanese and Iraqi Shi'i clients indicated that the factionalism that afflicted Iran had serious repercussions in Iran's own regional sphere of influence. As Iran drifted toward a struggle for succession, these clients could only wonder what the impending internal struggle portended for Iran's avowed commitment to the success of their bids for power. Among Iran's Shi'i admirers abroad, every tremor in Tehran was carefully registered, producing subtle but important realignments.

## MEETINGS ON ISLAM'S MARGINS

### MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD INTERNATIONAL IN EUROPE

One remarkable aspect of contemporary pan-Islamic activism was the absence of any regular and institutionalized exchange among Sunni Fundamentalist groups of the Muslim Brotherhood variety. There were many ties between these groups, but these remained informal or clandestine. Sunni Fundamentalists did occasionally meet under the auspices of the London-based Islamic Council of Europe. (For a previous instance, see *MECS* 1983–84, p 174.) It was in Europe that these groups operated and interacted with one another most freely. Geneva, city of refuge for Muslim activists for over half a century, provided a hospitable setting for a conference entitled "Islam, The Liberating Force," which met from 10–11 March 1986. Among those who addressed the gathering were Dr Necmettin Erbakan, leader of Turkey's outlawed National Salvation Party, and Ahmad Ben Bella, who, since his release from an Algerian prison in 1980, had adopted a Fundamentalist position.[128] But a number of scheduled speakers did not appear in the end. They included two Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideologues, Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali and Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il, as well as Sudan's Sadiq al-Mahdi.[129]

The conference called upon the ICO to admit the Afghan resistance organizations to full membership, called for the liberation of Palestine in its entirety, denounced the Syrian regime for its human rights violations, and appealed for the establishment of an Islamic order, based on Islamic Law, throughout Muslim lands. It was unusual, however, to see such a gathering condemn Saddam Husayn as the aggressor in the Gulf war. This perhaps explained the decision of notable activists to absent themselves from the conference, and indicated a possible split in Sunni Fundamentalist ranks over who should bear the blame for the continuing conflagration in the Gulf.[130] One source claimed that Ben Bella later met secretly in his Lausanne apartment for a week with representatives of various Muslim opposition movements, in order to plan a common strategy.[131]

### ISLAM'S CALL FROM LIBYA

Libya's Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi continued to lay claim to a position of primacy in Islam in his efforts to fend off international isolation. (For the wider context of Qadhdhafi's policy, see chapter on Libya.) Libya's embattled leader had accrued no discernible influence over Muslim movements in the heartlands of Islam. But in recent years the Libyan regime had built a substantial network of Muslim sympathizers in Europe, Black Africa and Southeast Asia, and these were now called upon to demonstrate their solidarity with Qadhdhafi in his moment of need.

The task of organizing and eliciting such demonstrations of support remained the

responsibility of the Tripoli-based Islamic Call Society (*Jam'iyyat al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*), under the guidance of Muhammad Ahmad al-Sharif. (On the Society, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp 293–94; 1982–83, p 245; 1984–85, p 161.) This Libyan-controlled international organization of Muslim activists had been established in 1970, but only in 1982 did it resolve to convene large-scale conferences every four years. Such a conference was due in 1986, and it met in Tripoli from 15–20 September 1986. Some 400 guests reportedly attended the proceedings. They included a deputy of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Uganda's Minister of Information, who arrived in the wake of Qadhdhafi's own visit to Uganda earlier in the month.[132] Other noteworthy participants included Syria's Chief Mufti, Shaykh Ahmad Kiftaru, and American Black Muslim leader Warith al-Din (Wallace Deen) Muhammad.[133]

An address by Qadhdhafi marked the high point in the deliberations of the conference. In his remarks, Qadhdhafi portrayed the gathering as evidence of "the mass Islamic support" for Libya in its battle against the "crusader-Zionist alliance against Islam." Israel and the US had become one; US Secretary of State George Shultz was "also a Jew — a Jew and a Zionist." To meet the threat to Islam, Qadhdhafi called for a *jihad* "against the Americans everywhere, against the Zionists everywhere," and urged Muslim volunteers from around the world to come to Libya, "the first stronghold of Islam," in order to defend it against aggression. Qadhdhafi also called for the establishment of an Islamic bank or fund, supported not by Muslim governments but by individuals, which would finance the *jihad*.[134] The conference resolutions endorsed these appeals in a routine manner, and also called on all Muslims to withdraw their deposits from foreign banks in order to invest them in the service of Islam.[135] The conference in fact had more the character of a rally, for the conferees greeted Qadhdhafi with tumultuous revolutionary sloganeering.[136] They also visited Qadhdhafi's home, to see for themselves the consequences of the April 1986 American aerial "terrorist" attack against the Libyan leader (see chapter on Libya).[137] Typical of the delegates' enthusiasm was a comment by a South African Muslim who attended the gathering: "I found Qadhdhafi to be a very warm person who loves life. He enjoys the acceptance and affection with which people meet him."[138]

During the year, the Islamic Call Society also successfully promoted the establishment of a Union of Islamic Councils in East, Central, and South Africa, headquartered in Uganda. These were all areas where Libya had invested much effort in creating a sympathetic Muslim following.[139] Alongside the overt propagation activities of the Islamic Call Society, there were numerous reports of continuing Libyan involvement with Muslim activists in places as diverse as Senegal, Ghana, Pakistan, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.[140] American Black Muslim leader Louis Farrakhan also attended a conference in Libya in March 1986, prompting the US Justice Department to investigate the circumstances of the visit.[141] Farrakhan's stateside organization reportedly received a $5m interest-free loan from Qadhdhafi.[142] But such demonstrations of solidarity did not spare Qadhdhafi the criticism of Libyan Muslim opposition groups allied with the Muslim Brotherhood abroad. In one notable instance, these accused the Libyan *haj* mission of assassinating one of their exiled leaders during the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1985, after luring him to the mission's headquarters.[143]

It was difficult to know whether Qadhdhafi's influence in the Muslim world was

enhanced or diminished by the US-Libyan confrontation of 1986. But the Libyan leader did not relent in declaring himself to be the visionary leader of all Islam and special patron of besieged Muslim minorities, even as he himself came increasingly under siege.

## MUSLIMS FOR PEACE IN THE SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union seemed an unlikely claimant to the title of defender of Muslim interests. But the Soviets had interests of their own in the Muslim world, and these they sought to defend by presenting Soviet policy as wholly compatible with the cause of Islam. This task, always difficult, had been complicated by the war in Afghanistan. As a result, the Soviets relied upon Soviet Muslims to sway Muslim opinion abroad. A success in this campaign was registered in an international conference of "Muslims for Peace," which met in Baku, Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, from 1–3 October 1986. A conference with the identical aim had been convened in September 1980 in Tashkent (see *MECS* 1980–81, pp 121–22). On that earlier occasion, Muslims from abroad were enticed to the Soviet Union by the (ultimately disappointed) expectation that the Soviets might be persuaded to withdraw from Afghanistan. That same expectation reappeared in 1986 in the wake of conciliatory statements made by Mikhail Gorbachev. Soviet exploitation of this expectation soon followed. The conveners of the conference in Baku meant to demonstrate that in the contest between the US and the Soviet Union for Muslim minds, the Soviets enjoyed a clear advantage, even as Soviet troops fought on Afghan soil.

It was essential that invitations to the conference be issued under Muslim auspices, a task fulfilled by Mufti Tal'at Tajuddin, Chairman of the Muslim Religious Board for the European Part of the USSR and Siberia. He played a growing role in representing Soviet Islam to Muslims elsewhere, and even led a group of Soviet Muslims on the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1985.[144] The conference itself gathered *c* 500–600 Muslim participants, 200 of whom came from abroad. Among those in attendance were Ministers of Islamic Affairs from Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria, a representative of Libya's Islamic Call Society, and the Secretary-General of the Muslim World League, 'Abdallah 'Umar al-Nasif, whose unexpected presence indicated Saudi interest in the proceedings. His participation was all the more remarkable as his predecessor had led a Muslim boycott of the Tashkent conference six years earlier.[145] The conference was greeted with a message from Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, who declared that "US bandit actions against Libya, Israeli refusal to withdraw its troops from South Lebanon, the threat of using force against Syria and other countries, are fraught with a direct danger to universal peace." The other threats to peace were the "bellicose imperialist circles" who were "pushing the world to a nuclear catastrophe."[146] During the conference itself, Muslim delegations joined their Soviet hosts in condemnation of Israel and support for the Soviet nuclear "peace initiative." As for Afghanistan, only Nasif raised his voice in measured criticism of his hosts. Nasif called on the Soviet Union to "reconsider its position on Afghanistan," because "the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan harms Moscow's relations with the Islamic world."[147]

The Baku conference evoked some favorable comment from sympathetic Leftists in the Muslim world.[148] But a Muslim critic lambasted "unknowing or complacent delegates who were impressed by Soviet hospitality, architectural monuments, restored

caravanserais, mosques, the market square of Baku, or by the Soviet rhetoric against the Israelis."[149] The Soviets understandably counted the event a success, and even established a permanent committee assigned to publicize its resolutions and perhaps convene future conferences.[150] Whether there occurred a more substantial dialogue between Muslim activists and the Soviets could not be determined. But the Soviets had clearly succeeded in convening a major Muslim gathering simply on the promise of a reassessment of policy on Afghanistan, and a reiteration of old positions on the Palestine question.

## THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1986

The pilgrimage, symbol of Islam's elusive unity, had become a setting of strife following Iran's Islamic revolution. (For the development of the pilgrimage controversy, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp 284–88, 301–3; 1982–83, pp 238, 249–51; 1983–84, pp 175–77; 1984–85, pp 161–64.) With the passage of time, Saudi Arabia and Iran reached a compromise that allowed Iran to conduct a tolerable measure of political propaganda during the pilgrimage. By this arrangement, Khomeyni's pilgrimage representative was permitted to organize two pilgrims' rallies, the first in Madina and the second in Mecca. Iranian pilgrims were also free to congregate in small groups with pilgrims from other Muslim lands, in order to explain the message and meaning of Iran's Islamic revolution.But two prohibitions applied. Pilgrims were not allowed to import printed materials of a political nature; and they were not to initiate spontaneous demonstrations. This understanding allowed Iran's pilgrims to vent their views, but enabled Saudi authorities to confine all demonstrating to two fixed events. The number of Iranian pilgrims also remained more or less fixed at 150,000. The Saudi authorities, concerned about terrible overcrowding, imposed quotas on the number of pilgrims from all countries, and Iran had no cause for complaint, since its pilgrims constituted 18 per cent of all foreign arrivals, the largest of all foreign pilgrimage groups.[151] But even if the ground rules and numbers were fixed, the Saudi-Iranian understanding was not a static one, and during each pilgrimage season it was subject to minor modification.

Montazeri again spelled out the obligations of Iran's pilgrims, in the customary gathering of Iranian pilgrimage functionaries that preceded the pilgrims' departure. Iranian pilgrims were to "stay away from conflict, not lose their tempers, and be ready at any moment to sacrifice and forgive; they should behave in such a way that they will earn respect for Islam and for the revolution." At the same time, they were to identify "influential and committed people" from other Muslim countries, and explain the revolution's achievements, thus "neutralizing the enemies' evil propaganda."[152] Khomeyni reiterated these themes in his annual pilgrimage message. He urged Iranians to tolerate any "mistreatment" and to carefully follow the instructions of Iranian officials at the permitted rallies. Khomeyni added to his usual points his instruction that Iran's pilgrims purchase no US-made articles and merchandise during their sojourn in Saudi Arabia: "Their purchase is tantamount to aiding the enemies of Islam."[153] It was difficult to determine whether this call for a boycott had any effect, as Iran claimed it did.[154]

In the holy cities, Khomeyni's representative, Hujjat al-Islam Mehdi Karrubi, supervised the activities of Iran's pilgrims for the second consecutive year. Karrubi had won Saudi respect for his avoidance of confrontation and his businesslike

approach to settling differences with the Saudi authorities.[155] Karrubi aimed at preserving the pilgrimage peace, while extracting Saudi concessions that would enhance Iran's influence over the rites. He soon found an appropriate issue of contention. Shortly after his arrival in Madina on 25 July 1986, Karrubi announced that the Saudi authorities were preventing Muslims from visiting al-Baqi' cemetery in Madina, in violation of an alleged Saudi promise.[156] A few days later, Karrubi met with the Saudi Cabinet Minister responsible for the pilgrimage, to request that the cemetery be opened for visitations by pilgrims; the Saudi Minister announced that a plan for opening the cemetery was under serious consderation.[157] A short time later, the cemetery was opened for visitations, and Karrubi expressed his formal appreciation to Saudi King Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz.[158]

What was the significance of the cemetery and its opening by the Saudi authorities? While the pilgrimage to Mecca holds the same significance for Sunnis and Shi'is, the visitation (*ziyara*) to Madina is of special significance for Shi'is. The cemetery of al-Baqi', near the city, is the reputed resting place of Fatima and four of the Twelve Imams, who are counted among Shi'ism's 14 intercessors. The Saudis, with their Wahhabi revulsion against all visitation, demolished al-Baqi' when they captured Madina 60 years ago. "The whole area, the resting place of so many of the Household of the Prophet, is but a desolate waste," wrote a contemporary scholar. "It remains a place of weeping, but the formal prayers invoking their intercession are no longer said at the tombs of the Imams in Madina."[159] After Iran's revolution, the formal prayers were reinstituted by Iran's pilgrimage supervisor, but only outside the perimeter of the cemetery, which was closed off by a high wall. The Saudi decision in 1986 to open the cemetery for visitations and prayer represented a major Saudi concession toward Iran's pilgrims; for while Iran tried to present the closure of al-Baqi' as offensive to all Muslims, it had constituted an insult only to Shi'is.

With this issue resolved, the pilgrimage seemed to unfold without incident. The Iranian-sponsored "Unity March" that took place on 1 August 1986 in Madina passed peacefully.[160] So too did the "Immunity from Pagans" march in Mecca on 11 August 1986.[161] Iran also sponsored a number of closed meetings, including a pilgrims' "seminar" for 200 Muslim scholars.[162]

Yet the understanding was breached on 8 August 1986, when 113 Iranian pilgrims from Isfahan were detained on arrival at Jidda Airport for "security reasons." The group was kept in detention throughout the pilgrimage, although they were allowed to observe the rituals in Mecca under police escort.[163] The continued detention of these pilgrims finally led Iranian Prime Minister Musavi to warn the Saudi Government that "if the problem is not rapidly solved, it may lead to a dangerous trend in relations between the two countries."[164] *Majlis* Speaker Rafsanjani also warned that "the incident might prove costly for bilateral relations."[165] But it did not, since all but ten of the detainees were released a few days later.[166]

Iran demonstrated remarkable restraint in this episode, for reasons which became known only later in the year. Some of the pilgrims on the flight carried concealed explosives — supplied by Mehdi Hashemi, according to his opponents, and by the IRGC, according to his supporters. The aim was allegedly to destroy the pilgrimage understanding between Iran and Saudi Arabia.[167] Iranian leaders were clearly embarrassed, and dissociated themselves from the plot by allowing the Saudis to

detain the pilgrims for weeks without protest. (Sources in Iran may even have tipped off the Saudi authorities in advance of the plane's arrival.)[168]

With the pilgrimage concluded, Karrubi termed the year's observances "good,"[169] and thanked King Fahd for the opening of al-Baqi' and the release of most of the detained Iranian pilgrims. "Your efforts in these matters opened new doors to hope toward further understanding between the two Muslim countries," Karrubi cabled Fahd, adding that "we condemn any plot that threatens the security of the two holy shrines or the *haj* pilgrims. We consider ourselves committed to the emphatic recommendations made by the leader of the revolution, Imam Khomeyni, in connection with safeguarding the security and discipline in the two blessed holy shrines."[170]

The pilgrimage peace had been preserved, despite the plot devised by the pilgrims from Isfahan. This was a testament to the success of the diplomacy of reconciliation with Saudi Arabia, a policy largely masterminded by Rafsanjani. But Montazeri's resentment of the Saudis, while contained, could not be repressed. In receiving Karrubi after the pilgrimage Montazeri did not laud the Saudis, but ridiculed them as "a minority sect completely isolated among Muslims" still bent on imposing its "divergent notions" on others. He demanded that the Saudis permit visitations at al-Baqi' and other shrines "at any time."[171] The outcome of the internal struggle for Iran would ultimately decide whether cooperation or confrontation would prevail at Islam's great annual assembly.

## NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here. Reference to JPRS publications is to the Near East edition, unless otherwise noted. The newspaper *Kayhan* cited here is the Tehran publication, unless otherwise noted.

1. R. Damascus, 8 January — DR, 8 January 1986.
2. MENA, 7 January — DR, 8 January 1986.
3. MAP, 8 January — DR, 9 January 1986.
4. Final resolutions, R. Rabat, 11 January — SWB, 14 January 1986.
5. MENA, 11 January — DR, 14 January 1986.
6. QNA, 30 July 1986.
7. Texts of statements, R. Rabat, 7 January — DR, 8 January; MAP, 11 January — DR, SWB, 13 January 1986.
8. INA, 7 January — DR, 8 January; AFP, 7 January — SWB, 9 January 1986.
9. AFP, 8 January — DR, 9 January; AFP, 10 January — DR, 14 January 1986.
10. KUNA, 30 December 1985 — DR, 2 January 1986.
11. INA, 10 January — DR, 10 January 1986.
12. Details of debate, *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 12 January 1986.
13. Tariq 'Aziz statement, R. Rabat, 11 January — SWB, 14 January; Iranian view, IRNA, 12 Januray — SWB, 14 January 1986.
14. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 15 January 1986.
15. Report on state of the committee, *al-Anba*, Kuwait, 25 September 1986.
16. *Impact International*, 14 February 1986.
17. Text of resolutions, R. Rabat, 22 January — DR, 23 January, SWB, 24 January 1986.
18. 'Arafat speech, R. Rabat, 21 January — DR, 22 January 1986.

19. See Martin Kramer, "Israel in the Muslim-Christian Dialogue," *IJA Research Report*, November 1986.
20. R. Rabat, 5 January — DR, 6 January 1986.
21. MAP, 6 January — DR, 7 January 1986.
22. Pirzada interview, *Impact International*, 27 February 1987.
23. R. Lagos, 28 January — SWB, 30 January; *Impact International*, 14 February; *LAT*, 15 February 1986.
24. *Arabia, The Islamic World Review*, June 1986.
25. *WP*, 15 April 1987.
26. Musavi interview, *Arabia, The Islamic World Review*, May 1986.
27. Pirzada's complaints over funding, *al-Riyad*, 29 December 1985; *al-Tadamun al-Islami*, June; *al-Bayan*, 4 October 1986.
28. Fu'ad 'Abd al-Hamid Ahmad al-Khatib interview, *Arabia, The Islamic World Review*, August 1986.
29. *'Ukaz*, 7 January 1986.
30. Pirzada interview, *Impact International*, 23 January 1987.
31. Pirzada interview, *Impact International*, 27 February 1987.
32. *Bernama*, 5 February — JPRS, 27 February 1987.
33. *Khaleej Times*, 19 March 1986.
34. Fu'ad 'Abd al-Hamid Ahmad al-Khatib interview, *Arabia, The Islamic World Review*, August 1986.
35. IDB statistics, *Arabia, The Islamic World Review*, April, May 1986.
36. Anatolia, 11 March — DR, 18 March 1986.
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38. R. Ankara, 15 March — DR, 18 March 1986.
39. Anatolia, 14 March — DR, 18 March 1986.
40. R. Ankara, 16 March — DR, 18 March 1986. In September 1986, the Standing Committee held a follow-up session; *Tercüman*, 11 September — JPRS (West Europe), 24 December 1986.
41. Pirzada interview, *Impact International*, 27 February 1987.
42. *Impact International*, 23 January 1987.
43. *MWL Journal*, November 1986.
44. *Akhbar al-'Alam al-Islami*, 10 February 1986.
45. *MWL Journal*, January-February 1986.
46. *Ha'aretz*, 23 September 1986.
47. Nasif interview, *al-Dustur*, Amman, 8 February; *'Ukaz*, 12 January 1986.
48. R. Israel, 3 May — DR, 5 May, SWB, 7 May; *Impact International*, 23 May 1986.
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50. SPA, 17 March — DR, 18 March 1986.
51. Accounts of conference and WAMY activities, *Impact International*, 14 March; *MWL Journal*, October 1986.
52. Account of committee's work, *MWL Journal*, December 1985-January 1986; account of Saudi and other Muslim relief, *Arabia, The Islamic World Review*, December 1986.
53. *WP*, 21 July 1986.
54. Announcements of awards, *MWL Journal*, January-February 1986.
55. Profile of Deedat, *Arabia, The Islamic World Review*, March 1986.
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58. *Arabia, The Islamic World Review*, March 1986; article also includes tables from DMI's fourth annual report.
59. *MEER*, April 1986.
60. *MEM*, October 1986.
61. See DTU's four-page advertisement, *Jeune Afrique*, 18 June 1986.
62. Debate over Islamic banking, *al-Ahram* (int ed), 23 December 1986, 7 January 1987 — JPRS, 26 February 1987.
63. Jadd al-Haqq news conference, supplement to *Majallat al-Azhar*, March 1987.
64. Jadd al-Haqq interview, *Akhbar al-Yawm*, 22 February 1986.

65. Article in *al-Mukhtar al-Islami*, July; reprinted in *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 13 October — JPRS, 26 November 1986.
66. Jadd al-Haqq statement, *al-Ahram*, 7 April 1986.
67. For another account, with somewhat different emphases, see R.K. Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and his article in *NYT*, 4 December 1986. For a (sensationalist) presentation of the other side of Iran's policy, see Amir Taheri, "The Fruits of Terror," *New Statesman*, 28 November 1986.
68. Musavi interview, *Arabia, The Islamic World Review*, May; cf IRNA, 2 May — SWB, 6 May 1986.
69. *MECS* 1983–84, p 167.
70. Ahmad Khomeyni's role, *Kayhan*, London, 8 January — JPRS, 24 February 1987.
71. McFarlane cable, *Report of the President's Special Review Board*, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 26 February 1987), p B–102. For a profile of Rafsanjani as moderate, see Robin Wright, "Iran's Smiling Powerbroker," *New Leader*, 12 January 1986.
72. For a biographical profile, see Yann Richard, "Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri," *Orient*, September 1985, pp 303–6.
73. This was the controversy over the tract entitled *Shahide Javid*, for which Montazeri had written an introduction. On the dispute, see Hamid Enayat, *Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp 190–94.
74. Details on Mehdi Hashemi's career, *al-Dustur*, London, 26 December 1983; *Le Figaro*, 11 January — JPRS, 14 March; *Lettre Persane*, June — JPRS, 24 September; *Le Monde*, 25 October — DR, 27 October; *al-Shira'*, Beirut, 3 November — DR, 6 November 1986. Hashemi had trained with Palestinians in Lebanon before the Iranian revolution; *The Times*, 23 October 1986.
75. On Mahallati see *al-Majalla*, 5 November 1983. According to *FR*, 30 January 1986, Mahallati was trained in Lebanon in the late 1960s, in a camp run by George Habash. Between 1970 and 1972 he reportedly ran a "school" in South Yemen, with a faculty composed of East German, Cuban, and Bulgarian instructors. For his death, see *WP*, 21 February; *LAT*, 21 February 1986.
76. *FR*, 27 February 1986.
77. *WP*, 21 April 1986.
78. Issue of Montazeri-Rafsanjani split discussed, *NYT*, 8 November; *WSJ*, 25 November 1986.
79. Rafsanjani speech, IRNA, 30 October — DR, 30 October 1986.
80. Account of charges by Intelligence Minister Muhammad Muhammadi-Reyshahri in letter to Khomeyni, R. Tehran, 27 October — DR, 28 October 1986.
81. For a general account of the affair's significance, see Robin Wright's piece in *CSM*, 5 November 1986.
82. *Le Monde*, 25 October; *MEES*, 3 November 1986, for analysis of kidnapping.
83. The Imam Muhammad Baqir Intelligence College; *FR*, 6 February; *Kayhan*, 29 September; *Impact International*, 10 October 1986.
84. *The Times*, 31 October 1986.
85. *Al-Shira'*, Beirut, 3 November — DR, 6 November 1986. The conduit for the leak was Shaykh Isma'il Khaliq, Montazeri's personal representative in Beirut; *al-Dustur*, London, 22 December; *WP*, 7 December 1986, where the editor of *al-Shira'* confirmed leak by Montazeri's office.
86. *FR*, 18 December 1986.
87. *Kayhan*, 18 November, cited by *Kayhan*, London, 4 December 1986 — JPRS, 3 February 1987.
88. Khosrowshahi's alleged appointment reported in *FR*, 22 January 1987; *Kayhan*, London, 25 December 1986 — JPRS, 5 February 1987 (possibly the basis of the *FR* report). For a reiteration of charges against Khosrowshahi (which first appeared in *ST*, 8 January 1984), see *WP*, 24 January 1986.
89. For new details on *Hizballah's* emergence, see *al-Shira'*, Beirut, 17 March, 1986.
90. *Al-Mustaqbal*, 13 September 1986.
91. See also Martin Kramer, "Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah," *Orient*, June 1985, pp 147–49;

and the full account of Fadlallah's differences with Iran in *al-Shira'*, Beirut, 4 August, 1986.
92. Shams al-Din interview, *al-Mustaqbal*, 5 March 1983.
93. E.g., Shams al-Din interview in Tehran, *Kayhan*, 8 February 1986. His second visit reported by IRNA, 31 July — DR, 31 July; IRNA, 2 August — DR, 4 August; third visit, IRNA, 29, 31 December — DR, 31 December 1986.
94. Amin interview, *Kayhan*, 9 February — JPRS, 16 April; Musawi interview, *Kayhan*, 9 February — JPRS, 16 April 1986.
95. Amin interview, *Kayhan*, 19 October 1985 — JPRS, 3 January 1986.
96. Texts of speeches by Khameneh'i and Rafsanjani, and papers by Fadlallah and Shams al-Din, *al-Tawhid*, 10 May; see also reports on conference, IRNA, 29 January — DR, 30 January; R. Tehran, 30 January — DR, 31 January; R. Tehran, 1 February — DR, 3 February 1986.
97. Text of resolutions, *al-Tawhid*, 10 May; R. Tehran, 31 January, 1 February — DR, 3 February 1986.
98. Fadlallah interview, *al-Shira'*, Beirut, 26 May; cf Fadlallah interview, *al-Tadamun*, 11 October 1986.
99. Shams al-Din interview, *Kayhan*, 8 February 1986.
100. Musawi interview, *Kayhan*, 27 July — DR, 18 August, JPRS, 30 September 1986.
101. Account of meeting, R. Tehran, 15 February — JPRS, 18 March 1986. Hostile Arab sources gave a completely different account of the conference and its significance. These claimed that Khomeyni met with the Lebanese participants after the conference to urge them to establish a provisional Islamic government, and asked that they draft an Islamic constitution for Lebanon. Khomeyni reportedly even authorized the establishment of revolutionary courts for Lebanon, and appointed 40 Lebanese as judges and prosecutors. Shams al-Din allegedly authored the draft constitution, which recognized Khomeyni as "ruler of the Muslims" but authorized Shams al-Din to act in his stead. The report named 63 supposed signatories to the draft, including Shams al-Din, Fadlallah, and Sha'ban. *Al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 26 March 1986. Later in the year, in an address to Lebanese students in Qom, Montazeri did urge "learned men of religion [in Lebanon] to form courts and appoint judges who can impartially implement God's will according to Islamic law"; *al-Safir*, 5 October 1986.
102. Fadlallah interview, *La Vanguardia*, 9 November — DR, 17 November 1986.
103. Fadlallah interview, *al-Shira'*, Beirut, 26 May 1986.
104. Fadlallah interview, *La Vanguardia*, 9 November — DR, 17 November 1986.
105. *NYT*, 21 November 1986.
106. On his connection with the hijacking, which he was said to have masterminded, see *NYT*, 14 March 1986.
107. *US News and World Report*, 30 March 1987.
108. Asad interview, Damascus TV, 18 May — DR, 19 May 1986.
109. Syrian-Iranian relations surveyed, *al-Dustur*, London, 2 June — JPRS, 29 July; *WSJ*, 23 May; *WP*, 29 May; *Memo*, 26 June — JPRS, 14 August 1986. See also the reporting by Jim Muir in *MEES* during May, June, and July 1986.
110. Shi'i debate over Resolution 425 summarized in *al-Mustaqbal*, 13 September 1986.
111. Catalogue of clashes, *al-Mujtama'*, 28 October 1986.
112. *Hizballah* in South, *WP*, 28 September; general assessment of conflict with UNIFIL, *MEES*, 29 September 1986.
113. Rafiqdust interviews, *al-'Alam*, 18 October 1986; *Middle East Insight*, May-June 1987.
114. R. Tehran, 7 April — DR, 9 April; *JI*, 20 April — JPRS, 23 June 1986. According to Iranian opposition sources, they were to be recruited into a brigade for irregular warfare; *Kayhan*, London, 17 April — JPRS, 14 May 1986.
115. IRNA, 27 March — DR, 28 March 1986.
116. IRNA, 22 April — SWB, 24 April 1986.
117. E.g., his attacks on Saudi Arabia, Mudarrasi interview, *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, June 1986. This article also includes some biographical details.
118. Account of Islamic Action's activities, R. Tehran, 10 May — DR, 12 May 1986.
119. *Al-Masar*, 16 July 1986.
120. *Al-Masar*, 30 May 1986.

121. Account of deportation, *Le Monde*, 8 March 1986.
122. *NYT*, 6, 11 13 March 1986.
123. *NYT*, 7 September 1986.
124. IRNA, 22 December — DR, 23 December; *MEED*, 13 December; *WP*, 30 December 1986; *Impact International*, 9 January; *Jeune Afrique*, 14 January 1987.
125. Khameneh'i speech, R. Tehran, 24 December — DR, 29 December 1986.
126. Conference resolutions, IRNA, 28 December — DR, 29 December 1986.
127. IRNA, 29 December — DR, 30 December 1986.
128. Account of conference, *Impact International*, 9 May 1986. For Ben Bella's current positions, see the interviews collected in *Ben Bella...revient* (Paris: Jean Picollec, 1982).
129. Scheduled speakers listed, *Impact International*, 28 February 1986.
130. *Impact International*, 9 May 1986.
131. *October*, 8 June 1986.
132. Speech by Ugandan Minister, *al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 17 September 1986.
133. *Al-'Alam*, 26 September 1986.
134. Qadhdhafi speech, Tripoli TV, 17 September — SWB, 19 September; R. Tripoli, 17 September — DR, 18 September; *al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 19 September 1986.
135. Report of resolutions, JANA, 21 September — DR, 22 September; SWB, 24 September 1986. In another move, the conferees formally renamed their organization the World Islamic Call Society (*Jam'iyyat al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyya*), a usage the Libyans had already adopted with the apparent intention of stressing the organization's international composition. See also *Impact International*, 10 October 1986.
136. Report of Qadhdhafi's reception, *al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 19 September 1986.
137. Report of visit, *al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 17 September 1986.
138. *Grassroots* (Cape Town), October — JPRS (Sub-Saharan Africa), 4 December 1986.
139. *Impact International*, 28 November 1986.
140. Libya's African activities, *Washington Times*, 24 June; Asian activities, *Newsweek*, 28 July 1986.
141. *WP*, 13 April 1986.
142. *Impact International*, 14 March 1986.
143. *Arabia, The Islamic World Review*, May 1986.
144. Tajuddin interview, *al-'Awda*, 15 September 1986.
145. In fact, Nasif had been preceded in the Soviet Union by the MWL's Deputy Secretary-General, who spent two weeks in the Soviet Union as a guest of Muslim religious boards there; *Impact International*, 23 May 1986.
146. Text of Ryzhkov greeting, Tass, 1 October — JPRS (Soviet Union, Political and Sociological), 12 November 1986.
147. KUNA, 3 October — JPRS (Soviet Union, Political and Sociological), 12 November 1986.
148. E.g. *al-Ahali*, 12 November — JPRS, 29 December 1986,
149. *Impact International*, 26 December 1986.
150. R. Damascus, 3 October; Tass, 3 October — JPRS (Soviet Union, Political and Sociological), 12 November 1986.
151. Figures for 1986, *'Ukaz*, 20 August; *Arabia, The Islamic World Review*, October 1986.
152. Montazeri speech, R. Tehran, 4 July — JPRS, 4 August 1986.
153. Khomeyni message, R. Tehran, 7 August — SWB, 9 August; IRNA, 8 August — DR, 11 August; official text, IRNA, 9 August — DR, 12 August 1986.
154. R. Tehran, 7 August — SWB, 12 August 1986.
155. It would later be reported that his brother played a central role in dealing with both Americans and Israelis in the arms-for-hostages negotiations; *US News and World Report*, 30 March 1987.
156. R. Tehran, 27 July — DR, SWB, 29 July 1986.
157. R. Tehran, 30 July — DR, 31 July, SWB, 1 August 1986.
158. R. Tehran, 29 August — DR, 3 September 1986.
159 Dwight M. Donaldson, *The Shi'ite Religion* (London, 1930), p 151. For a description of the demolition, see Eldon Rutter, *The Holy Cities of Arabia* (London, 1930), pp 562–64.
160. R. Tehran, 2 August — SWB, 4 August 1986. Iran claimed that 150,000 pilgrims participated.

161. Accounts of march, IRNA, 12 August — DR, 15 August; (clandestine) Voice of the Pilgrims (to Saudi Arabia), 15 August — DR, 27 August 1986. Iran claimed that 20,000 pilgrims participated.
162. R. Tehran, 11 August — SWB, 13 August; seminar on Iraqi-Iranian war, IRNA, 20 August — DR, 21 August 1986.
163. IRNA, 10 August — DR, 11 August; SPA, 11 August — DR, 11 August 1986.
164. Musavi statement, IRNA, 25 August — DR, 25 August; R. Tehran, 25 August 1986.
165. Rafsanjani speech, R. Tehran, 24 August — SWB, 26 August 1986.
166. R. Tehran, 28 August — DR, 28 August 1986.
167. *NYT*, 29 August; *The Times*, 29 November; *al-Shira'*, Beirut, 3 November — DR, 6 November 1986.
168. *The Times*, 29 November 1986.
169. IRNA, 1 September — DR, 3 September 1986.
170. Text of Karrubi cable, R. Tehran, 29 August — DR, 3 September 1986.
171. R. Tehran, 9 September — DR, 9 September, SWB, 10 September 1986.